#Mass bill of particulars trial

Gants, C.J., dissenting in part, with whom Lenk and Budd, JJ., joined.Īt a criminal trial, the judge did not err in instructing the jury that arson was a felony that was inherently dangerous to human life.

#Mass bill of particulars trial

266, § 1, suggested such culpability however, the error did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, where the error did not materially affect the jury's verdict, in that the Commonwealth, despite agreeing with the trial judge's suggestion that such an instruction was warranted and should be given, never argued to the jury that the defendant accidentally or negligently set the fire or that she formed the requisite intent after having set the fire, and in that the evidence regarding the defendant's acts or omissions after she set the fire was relevant and admissible regarding both arson and involuntary manslaughter.

Īt a criminal trial, the judge erred in instructing the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of arson for the wilful and malicious failure to extinguish or report a fire that has been set accidentally or negligently, where nothing in the language of G. 266, § 1, when she set fire to a bag of her boyfriend's clothing located inside an apartment for the purpose of exacting revenge against her boyfriend, and moreover, a reasonable person, under those circumstances, would have known that there was a plain and strong likelihood that some portion of the apartment building would be set on fire or burned further, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant had the specific intent to burn some portion of the apartment building and not just the clothing. Īt a criminal trial, the evidence was overwhelming that the defendant acted with general intent and malice for purposes of G. 266, § 1, as requiring proof of general intent with malice or, in the absence of proof that a defendant acted purposefully to set fire to or burn some portion of a dwelling house, proof that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known that there was a plain and strong likelihood that some portion of a dwelling house would be set on fire or burned. Due Process of Law, Sentence.ĭiscussion of arson under G. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, New trial, Bill of particulars, Sentence, Grand jury proceedings, Dismissal. Evidence, Intent, Grand jury proceedings.

(4) SJC-12431 07 Appellant Pfeiffer Reply Brief.

(3) SJC-12431 05 Appellee Commonwealth Brief.

(2) SJC-12431 05 Amicus District Attorneys Brief.

(1) SJC-12431 02 Appellant Pfeiffer New Brief.

110 SeptemCourt Below: Superior Court, Suffolk County Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.